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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I focus on two undervalued aspects of Nietzsche’s admiration of the ancient
Greeks: the healthy psychology of the Greeks, and the origins of this health in Homeric poetry. I
argue that Homer was a cultural physician for the ancient Greeks and is responsible for creating
a new, healthy set of values through his epic poetry. In turn, these Homeric values brought
Greece into its “tragic age”—a time during which Greek culture was “the highest authority for
what we may term cultural health” (PTAG 1). Moreover, Homer’s success as a cultural physician
comes from his ability to lie poetically lie. So, I also give an account of how Nietzsche thinks
this kind of lying is psychologically possible through what I call Nietzschean dissimulation.
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INTRODUCTION

In his inaugural address at the University of Basel, Nietzsche lectured on the “Homeric
question,” which is “the question of the personality of Homer” (HCP 151). This question was
central to debates in nineteenth century German philology.1 As James Porter argues, Nietzsche’s
early philological career focused on “the formation of Homer as a locus of cultural value: indeed,
[these works] are an inquiry into the value of this value” (Porter 2004, 7). For Nietzsche,
however, the Homeric question reveals less about the personality of Homer and more about “the
weight of the personalities of the philologists!” (ibid.) On Nietzsche’s view, the popular
caricature of ancient Greece as a civilized culture of rational discourse and the birthplace of
impartial inquiry did not faithfully represent how Homeric texts described ancient Greek culture.
In these texts, the Greeks waged constant brutal warfare, worshipped vengeful gods, and loved
art in virtue of its beauty, not its truth. As a young Classical philologist, Nietzsche recognized
what his colleagues and contemporaries missed in “the gulf between the ideal antiquity […] and
the real antiquity” (HCP 150). According to Nietzsche, philology properly done poses a threat to
the idealized image of the Greeks—an image that many of his contemporaries held. Indeed, by
discovering the “real image of antiquity,” we can see that the Greeks “have a trait of cruelty, of
tiger-like pleasure in destruction [tigerartiger Vernichtungslust]” (HC 174). And for Nietzsche,
they take pleasure in this instinctual cruelty—a quality that is praiseworthy and healthy.
In this thesis, I focus on two undervalued aspects of Nietzsche’s admiration of the ancient
Greeks: the healthy psychology of the Greeks, and the origins of this health in Homeric poetry. I
The question focused mostly on whether Homer was an individual or a tradition of poets. Heinrich Schliemann’s
archaeological discoveries in the early nineteenth century, according to James Porter, revitalized the idea that Homer
was “not a phantom but a material reality” (Porter 2004, 16). On the other side of the debate was Richard
Claverhouse Jebb. Porter describes Jebb’s reaction to Schliemann: “what Schliemann unearthed was both excitingly
and frighteningly strange, and Jebb would have none of it. He disputed Schliemann’s methods and challenged his
findings” (ibid.). The debate between Schliemann and Jebb surrounding the Homeric question continued to be
important for philologists throughout the nineteenth century.
1
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argue that Homer was a cultural physician for the ancient Greeks and is responsible for creating
a new, healthy set of values through his epic poetry. In turn, these Homeric values brought
Greece into its “tragic age”—a time during which Greek culture, according to Nietzsche, was
“the highest authority for what we may term cultural health” (PTAG 1). I make my argument in
two main sections. In the first section, I explain what it means on Nietzsche’s view to be a
“cultural physician,” and how Homer was the first successful physician after the failure of
previous attempts to unify ancient Greek culture under a set of values, namely by the Orphic
cults and Hesiod. Homer’s success comes from his ability to lie poetically about the events that
led up to the fall of Troy and the unification of the ancient Greek world. In the second section, I
give an account of how Nietzsche thinks it is psychologically possible for a person to lie to
herself through, what I call, Nietzschean dissimulation.

3
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A HEALTHY HOMERIC PSYCHOLOGY

When Nietzsche praises the Greeks, he does not have in mind a static, monolithic culture.
He understood that ancient Greece underwent transformative cultural shifts over the course of
hundreds of years. Nietzsche is most interested in the Greeks of what he calls the “tragic age,”
which spans from Homer to what he sees as the degeneration of Greek culture with Socrates and
Plato. The specific dates are less important for Nietzsche than that the healthy era of Greece fell
between two periods of illness. Before the tragic age, Greece was in a “pre-Homeric abyss” (HC
179)—a time in which “Orpheus, Musaeus and their cults reveal what were the conclusions to
which a continual exposure to a world of combat and cruelty led—to a nausea at existence, to the
view of existence as a punishment” (HC 175). The period in Greece before Homer is an “abyss”
because at that time, Nietzsche describes, the cities located around the Greek peninsula were
engulfed in a “bloody jealousy of one town for another, one party for another” (GSt 167).
Moreover, a “murderous greed of those petty wars, the tiger-like triumph over the corpse of the
slain enemy, in short, the continual renewal of those Trojan battle-scenes” (ibid.) became the
continuous state of the Greeks. And, as Nietzsche argues, “without a state, in the natural bellum
omnium contra omnes, society is completely unable to grow roots in any significant measure and
beyond the family sphere” (GSt 170). According to Nietzsche, as a result of the political
instability in the Greek peninsula and the surrounding Mediterranean, the Greeks produced
mythologies symptomatic of a pessimistic and war-torn culture, which, to use Hobbes’ phrase,
rendered human life as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1651, 78). 2
Because the Greeks emerged from this abyss to convalescence, Nietzsche describes the
Greeks’ health in the tragic age as an “achievement.” He argues, “The celebrated clarity,

Nietzsche’s description of “the natural bellum omnium contra omnes [a war of all against all]” is a direct reference
to Hobbes from whom Nietzsche borrows the phrase.
2
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transparency, simplicity and orderliness of the Greeks, […] can easily mislead us into believing
that all this was simply handed to the Greeks” (HH II: 219).3 Moreover, what is distinct about the
tragic age is the dominance of Homeric values. For it is Homer who “liberated Greece from
Asiatic pomp,4 vagueness and obscurity and […] attained to architectural clarity on a large scale
and a small” (ibid.). 5 Nietzsche asks, “where do we look if we stride backwards into the preHomeric world, without Homer's guiding and protecting hand? Only into night and horror, into
the products of a fantasy used to ghastly things” (ibid.). Thus, out of the pre-Homeric abyss,
Homer was the cultural physician who brought Greece into an age of health.
Homer’s role as cultural physician here is crucial. Nietzsche discusses cultures as being
either healthy or decadent. We should not take terms like “cultural health” or “decadence” to be
merely metaphorical for Nietzsche. When he discusses the “health” or “decay” of a culture, he is
referring to the psychological and physiological state of the individuals in that culture. In
Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche gives an account of what a culture is and what the task of a
cultural physician is in relation to it:
The various cultures are various spiritual climates each of which is especially harmful
or healthful to this or that organism. History as a whole, as knowledge of the various
cultures, is pharmacology but not the science of medicine itself. The physician is still
needed who will avail himself of this pharmacology to send each person to the climate
favorable precisely to him—for a period of time or forever. (HH II: 188)

3

See also WC 375; HH II: 220.
When Nietzsche mentions the pre-Homeric “Asiatic pomp,” he is referring to Orphism, which is thought to have
originated in Asia minor. See, for example, Ovid IV.1, and also Early Notebooks 7[123]; HC 175-6; HH II: 219.
5
Jessica Berry gives an account of this Homeric “liberation” on Nietzsche’s view. She argues, “Freedom, in this
non-metaphysically loaded sense of a mere absence of constraint or even of never having known such constraint, is
in Homer’s case a freedom from superstition, from the crushing weight of moral convention, and from the systems
of morality that tyrannize modern individuals” (Berry 2013, 90). This notion of freedom is consistent with
Nietzsche’s fatalism because, as Donovan Miyasaki argues, “Nietzsche’s normative ideal of a higher, more valuable
human type consists of the only kind of agency he believes to be possible: the mere feeling of freedom—the
qualitative feeling alone, without deeper substance” (Miyasaki 2016, 256).
4
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Before a physician can prescribe a cure, she must first understand the physiology of her subject.
She must understand how a patient’s illness disrupts this physiology, and what “climate” is
necessary for convalescence. To understand properly the health the Greeks achieved through
Homer, we must first understand Nietzsche’s view of the psycho-physiology of the Greeks prior
to Homer; the Orphic illness; the failure of others, namely Hesiod, to cure the Greeks; and how
Homer succeeded as a cultural physician. Crucially, Nietzsche argues that we may gain insight
about the nature of different cultures in different periods of history from a careful analysis of
their language and the texts they wrote. Nietzsche calls this form of analysis philology. He
describes philology as the ability “to read facts without falsifying them through interpretations,
without letting the desire to understand make you lose caution, patience, subtlety. Philology as
ephexis in interpretation” (A 52). Nietzsche’s analysis of the Orphic texts, Hesiod, and Homer is
an attempt to understand how Homer came to be the dominant locus of value in Greek culture
without letting modern values pollute that understanding. Moreover, the Homeric poems are full
of poetic accounts of bloody battles, lying characters, and petty gods. Nietzsche wants to
understand why these events and characters became the Greek ideal and what their success as
cultural ideals tells about the psychology and physiology of the creatures who adopted them.

2.1

The Simple and Logical Greeks
The Greeks acquired their health, but Nietzsche maintains that certain psycho-

physiological traits were characteristic of the Greeks throughout their history. For example,
Nietzsche argues, “The Greeks are indescribably logical [logisch] and simple [schlicht] in all
their thought; at least in their long good age they never wearied of this” (GS 82). To understand

6

what Nietzsche means by “simple [schlicht]”6 thought, we may contrast it to the psychological
complexities of the priestly type. On Nietzsche’s view, the priestly types complicated the
otherwise simple relations among evaluative concepts for aristocratic cultures, like the Greeks.
While the Greeks instinctively equated nobility and goodness (GM I: 7), the priestly types
complicated this relation by judging that “the miserable alone are good” (ibid.). The former
equation is “coarse, crude, superficial, narrow, straightforward, and above all unsymbolic” (i.e.,
simple), while the latter is “its inversion” (GM I: 6). The simplicity of Greek thought is
instinctual—the instinctual evaluation that “nobility is good” does not require calculation and
does not lend itself to reflection. The “inversion” of these concepts, however, requires reflective
reasoning, and through it “man first became an interesting animal, [...] only here did the human
soul acquire depth in a higher sense and become evil” (ibid.).
One way in which the Greeks were simpler than moderns—one way in which they hadn’t
yet acquired “depth”—is that the Greeks saw value in cruelty. Nietzsche describes the experience
of cruelty: “To see somebody suffer is nice, to make somebody suffer even nicer—that is a hard
proposition, but an ancient, powerful, human-all-too-human proposition” (GM II: 6). “Cruelty,”
Nietzsche argues, “is one of the oldest festive joys of mankind” (D 18). Moreover, Nietzsche
argues that the Greeks “have a trait of cruelty, of tiger-like pleasure in destruction
[Vernichtungslust]” (HC 174, emphasis added). The impulse to cruelty is a facet of human
psychology in general, and the Greeks took joy in this cruelty. The value equation that “cruelty is
good” is not arrived at by reflection; it is a simple, instinctual reaction to the fact that the Greeks
experienced cruelty as pleasurable.
In addition to their simple thinking, Nietzsche describes the Greeks as “logical in all their

6

‘Schlicht’ means ‘simple’ in the sense that something is ‘uncluttered’, ‘unpretentious’, or ‘plain’.
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thought” (GS 82). He argues, “What was the point of the Greeks? […] All the presuppositions
for a scholarly culture, all the scientific methods were already there, […] the factual sense, the
last and most valuable of all the senses had schools and traditions that were already centuries
old!” (A 59) In his early lectures on the pre-Platonic philosophers, Nietzsche describes this
“factual sense” more explicitly. He argues,
The Greeks regarded Thales of Miletus as the first philosopher. In itself it is arbitrary
to say that so-and-so is the first and that before him there were no philosophers, for a
type does not [come to] exist all at once. Such a stipulation follows from a definition of
“the philosopher.” This [riddle of defining philosopher] is what we seek to solve.
Thales posits a principle from which he makes deductions; he is foremost a
systematizer. It might be argued that, on the contrary, we already find the same quality
in many of the older cosmogonies. We need only to think of the cosmological notions
in the Iliad, then the Theogony, then the Orphic theogonies. (PPP 2)
In this passage, Nietzsche presents several historical examples of how the Greeks had a drive to
understand the world systematically. The Greeks, whether philosophers or poets, seek to uncover
facts; they want to create explanatory systems to help themunderstand the world in terms of
certain truths. Later in his lectures Nietzsche argues, “The power to systematize—very strong in
the Greeks’ ranking and genesis of their gods—presents us with a drive never coming to rest”
(PPP 3). If we look at Thales’ case more closely, we can see that the Greek desire to
systematize. Nietzsche argues,
I do not mean, of course, that Thales’ thought in some attenuated or restricted sense
contains a sort of poetic truth. One might imagine there could be some sort of value in
it for an artist, […] the whole typology, in fact, of sculpture—might well find the
proposition, “all is water,” a true one. On the contrary, the thought of Thales—even
after realization that it is unprovable—has its value precisely in the fact that it was
meant non-mythically and non-allegorically. (PTAG 3)
Thales wanted to create a system to explain the world in terms of a truth that he considered
verifiable. This drive to systematize is what makes the Greeks’ thought “logical.” And as
Nietzsche mentions, this drive is an instinct older than Thales (PPP 2).
It is important to note that the simplicity of thought and the factual sense Nietzsche
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ascribes to the Greeks are not by themselves sufficient for health. As Jessica Berry argues, “the
‘will to a system’ Nietzsche denounces is the hypertrophied desire for understanding that, qua
pathological, is the cause of so many philosophical ‘symptoms’” (Berry, forthcoming), which is
well-supported by much of what Nietzsche maintains regarding “systematizers” (TI ‘Arrows’ 26;
D 318). Moreover, according to Berry, the will to systematize is motivated by an unchecked will
to truth. She argues, “What is crucial is that the will to truth that informs all genuinely scientific
endeavors not become insatiable, not become attached to the value of truth as unconditional.
‘Everything unconditional,’ Nietzsche says, ‘belongs to pathology’ (BGE 154)” (Berry,
forthcoming). So, the power to systematize is an expression of a particularly powerful—
dominant or even unconditional—will to truth. The systematizing instinct of the Greeks is, if left
untreated, pathological. In the next section, I show how this pathology plagued the Greeks before
the tragic age.

2.2

The Orphic Illness
The unification of Greece as a healthy culture would need to come from a system of

values that allowed the Greeks to flourish given their “simple” and “logical” thought. Any
cultural physician that would attempt to create a healthy set of values for the Greeks would need
to consider these impulses as fundamental to her patient’s healthy psycho-physiology. In other
words, a cultural physician cannot ignore the psycho-physiological facts; this way of thinking
must be regarded as a healthy process of the organism, not a disruption of a healthy process.
Nietzsche presents three poetic attempts to establish a system of values for the Greeks: the
Orphics, Hesiod, and Homer (PPP 2).

9

As I will show in this section, Nietzsche’s view of the Orphics’ attempt at systemization
was an attempt to establish two primary values: (i) that what is related to the soul is good, and
(ii) that what is related to the body is bad. The systemization of these values, according to
Nietzsche, was an illness for the Greeks, though a short-lived one. Nietzsche argues, “If we
stride backwards into the pre-Homeric world, without Homer’s guiding hand to protect us,” we
delve, “only into night and horror [...] where earthly existence is reflected in these repellingly
dreadful legends” (HC 175). Orphism emerged from this “pre-Homeric abyss,” and is
historically, according to Nietzsche, the first attempt at a systematic theogony.7 He outlines four
different versions of Orphic Theogony. In the first version, the creator-gods are Night, Heaven,
Chaos, and Ocean (PPP 3). The pre-Homeric “abyss” refers to the age in which the mystery
cults, including Orphism, were widespread religions in Greece. Although the precise origin and
establishment of these cults is unknown, there is a general Orphic doctrine, as reported by both
Plato and Pindar. In Plato’s Cratylus, for example, Socrates discusses several possibilities for the
etymology of the term ‘body’ (σῶμα). First, Socrates speculates that ‘body’ (σῶμα) is derived
from ‘grave’ (σημα). He then speculates that “those around Orpheus” (οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα) are most
likely responsible for inventing the term ‘body’. Socrates then explains, “[the Orphics] were
under the impression that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an
enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (σώζω), as the name body (σῶμα)
implies” (Cratylus 400c). The accuracy of Socrates’ etymology, which is speculative, is not
important; however, the description of the Orphics’ view of the body is. It is important because

7

The dispute about whether Orphism is earlier than Homer is controversial because there is no mention of Orphism
in the Iliad or Odyssey. However, in “Homer’s Contest,” Nietzsche clearly argues that Orphism is pre-Homeric.
Biebuyck, Praet, and Vanden Poel give a reason for Nietzsche’s position: “Homer’s silence on the topic had, in
Nietzsche’s view, nothing to do with the sequence of historical events, but with a deliberate strategy founded on
manifest lack of agreement between Orphic thought and the spirit of Homeric poetry” (Biebuyck et al., 2004, 166).
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this view of the body is “a misunderstanding of the body” (GS P 2) and symptomatic of a lifedenying philosophy.
Furthermore, in the Meno, Plato reports the primary importance of the soul, according to
Orphic doctrine, and the function the soul plays in determining punishment in the afterlife. Plato
describes these central tenets of Orphism in the following way:
As Pindar too says it, and many others of the divine among our poets. What they say is
this; […] They say that the human soul is immortal; at times it comes to an end, which
they call dying; at times it is reborn, but never destroyed, and one must therefore live
one’s life as piously as possible:
Persephone will return to the sun above in the ninth year
The soul of those from whom
She will exact punishment for old miseries. (Meno 81b)
The Orphic cults were based on the myth that humans are the descendants of the Titans, who
were responsible for killing Dionysus. As bearers of the Titans’ burden, humans are subject to
punishment in the afterlife depending on how virtuous they were on earth. Crucially for
Nietzsche, Orphism is a religion based on one’s personal responsibility for one’s own actions,
which then determine eternal punishment or reward. It is an ascetic religion in which one denies
the body to promise a better condition for the soul after death. Therefore, on Nietzsche’s view,
Orphism led “to nausea at existence, to the view of existence as a punishment to be discharged
by serving out one’s time, to the belief that existence and indebtedness were identical” (HC 175).
The Orphic doctrine also led to certain constraints on how one ought to act in order to secure a
preferable after-life; for instance, “keeping wholly to inanimate food” (Laws 782c). In the
Gorgias, Socrates endorses this Orphic view of the body by quoting Euripides: “For I tell you I
should not wonder if Euripides’ words were true, when he says: ‘Who knows if to live is to be
dead, And to be dead, to live?’ and we really, it may be, are dead; in fact I once heard sages [the
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Orphics] say that we are now dead, and the body is our tomb” (Gorgias 492e-493a).8
Orphism was a product of the Greeks’ instinct to systematize. That is, it was an attempt to
provide a totalizing explanatory system about the gods, cosmos, and humans’ relation to these.
According to Nietzsche, “precisely these [Orphic] conclusions are not specifically Hellenic” (HC
175). Such conclusions led to the failure of an Orphic reformation in Greece—“all [Orphism]
managed to found were sects” (GS 149). The Orphic imperatives of how one ought to live (e.g.,
that one must be a vegetarian to avoid eternal punishment) are non-Hellenic in the sense that
such demands are different from established cultural norms in pre-Homeric ancient Greece.
More importantly, Orphism was an attempt to suppress the Greeks’ “tiger-like love of
destruction [Vernichtungslust].”
On Nietzsche’s view of physiology, ignoring or resisting one’s instinct does not destroy
that instinct. Instead, Nietzsche argues, “All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly
turn themselves inwards” (GM II: 16). For example, the priestly type’s denial of “the instinct for
freedom” in the Genealogy does not lead to the destruction of that instinct—it redirects it
inwards. Nietzsche argues, “The instinct for freedom, forcibly made latent [...] Driven back,
suppressed, imprisoned within, and finally discharging itself only on itself: this, only this, is bad
conscience in its beginnings” (GM II: 17). However, unlike the slave revolt from the first section
of the Genealogy, in which the priestly types “undoubtedly succeeded” (GM I: 9), the Orphic
demands were physiologically impossible9 for the Greeks to sustain. Nietzsche argues,
To demand of strength that it not express itself as strength, that it not be a desire to
overwhelm, a desire to cast down, a desire to become lord, a thirst for enemies and
resistances and triumphs, is just as nonsensical as to demand of weakness that is
express itself as strength. (GM I: 13)
See also Plato’s Phaedo 80c-84b.
To call this demand psychologically impossible might seem implausible. However, I should note that the demand
was (i) impossible to sustain, and (ii) Nietzsche does not recognize enough of a distinction between the
psychological and the physiological to make what is psychologically unsustainable physiologically possible.
8
9
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Orphism nonsensically demanded that the Greeks not be who they were and not take pleasure in
destruction. So, on the one hand, Orphism’s attempts to provide a totalizing theogony and
cosmology satisfied the Greek instinct to systematize. On the other hand, the Orphic reformation
failed because it made a physiologically impossible demand. Nietzsche argues, “That several
attempts to found new Greek religions have failed testifies to the higher culture of the Greeks
even in rather early times” (GS 149). However, the Greeks’ strong lust for destruction is not
sufficient for bringing about a healthy culture. As Brian Leiter notes, on Nietzsche’s view,
“human beings are by nature cruel and aggressive, but giving free rein to those natural impulses
would obviously be incompatible with communal life” (Leiter 2015, 178). So, for the Greeks to
be a culture, which requires communal living, any system of values or cultural institutions would
need to provide either an outlet for Vernichtungslust or sufficient power to redirect it internally.
Orphism provided neither of these.

2.3

Hesiod’s Failure
In the wake of Orphism’s failed reformation, there came two more attempts to establish a

unifying mythology: Hesiod and Homer. What distinguishes Hesiod and Homer from the
Orphics is what Nietzsche calls in “Homer’s Contest” the “Greek genius.” As opposed to the
Orphics who, as Nietzsche argues, “thought that a life rooted in such an impulse [to combat and
victory] was not worth living” (HC 176), the Greeks continued to view existing impulses as
unavoidable. For example, Hesiod views envy as an unavoidable affect; it is not something that
can be ignored. Hesiod writes, “There are two Eris-headed goddesses on earth” (Works and Days
11), and,
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One should praise the one Eris10 as much as blame the other, if one has any sense;
because the two goddesses have quite separate dispositions. One promotes wicked war
and feuding, the cruel thing! No mortal likes her, but the yoke of necessity forces man
to honor the heavy burden of this Eris according to the decrees of the Immortals. Black
Night gave birth to the older of the two; but Zeus, who reigned on high, placed the
other on the roots of the earth and amongst men as a much better one. She drives even
the unskilled man to work [...] This Eris is good for men. (Works and Days, 12-26)
This passage, which Nietzsche quotes in full in “Homer’s Contest,” shows that Hesiod observed
that envy is unavoidable—we are instinctively envious creatures. Importantly, Hesiod does not
indicate that humans are agents who deserve praise or blame. Instead, we should assign praise
and blame to Eris. In both its good and wicked forms, Eris drives humans to act. On the one
hand, “no mortal man likes” the bad Eris, but “the yoke of necessity” forces humans to act in
accordance with it. That is, “according to the decrees of the Immortals.” And on the other hand,
humans may experience envy “as the effect of a benevolent deity” (HC 177). On Hesiod’s view,
humans are passive subjects whom Eris drives to act in certain ways; they lack agency. Hesiod’s
view of Eris is in opposition to the Orphics, who viewed humans as agents responsible for their
actions and deserving of punishment in the afterlife. In later work, Nietzsche criticizes “the
psychology of the will,” in which “people were considered ‘free’ so that they could be judged
and punished—so that they could be guilty” (TI ‘Errors’ 7). The Orphics attribute agency to
people, and therefore, responsibility, desert, and punishment. The genius of Hesiod, Nietzsche
argues, is that he “acknowledges the existing impulse, terrible as it was, and regarded it as
justified” (HC 176). Hesiod still believes that praise and blame are justified, but responsibility
does not come from a human’s choosing to act from envy; rather, we should praise or blame Eris
for human envy.

10

Nietzsche does not distinguish between Eris and envy here. In another passage about Hesiod, Nietzsche argues,
“Hesiod counted [envy] among the effects of the good, beneficent Eris” (D 38). My explanation for this is that
“envy” is the relevant affect in both cases. The Greeks thought this came from Eris; Nietzsche thinks it comes from
the drives.
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Hesiod recognized that envy is good for humans in one form. In its good form, envy
“drives even the unskilled man to work” (Works and Days, 25). However, this observation alone
does not provide a way out of “the pre-Homeric abyss” (HC 179). For example, Hesiod
recognized the unavoidability of Eris, but he considered it in one of its forms to be wicked.
Nietzsche argues,
The envious man is conscious of every respect in which the man he envies exceeds the
common measure and desires to push him down to it—or to raise himself up to the
height of the other: out of which there arise two different modes of action which
Hesiod designated as the evil and the good Eris. (HH II: 29)
Envy in its good form motivates an individual to become more excellent: “to raise oneself up to
the height of the other.” In a discussion about Hesiod’s view of envy, Nietzsche argues “there
was nothing offensive [for Hesiod] in attributing to the gods something of envy: which is
comprehensible under a condition of things the soul of which was contest” (D 38). The good Eris
is a motive to become better compared to someone else. However, even though it can motivate
us to become great, it also has the power to lead to a world of wickedness. Eris, in one of her
forms, is a motivating force that “no mortal likes” (HC 176). In its wicked form, envy motivates
a person to push his opponent “down to the common measure.” Christa Davis Acampora
describes the motivational difference between these two kinds of envy:
One can defeat an opponent in at least two ways: either by summoning a superlative
performance from oneself, thereby winning by surpassing one’s opposition, or by
diminishing the capacities of one’s opponent, thereby undercutting his excellence and
overcoming by diminishing one’s opposition. (Acampora 2013, 19)
Good envy is a quality of the healthy individual who is focused on her own excellence; bad envy
results from a hatefulness towards another—it is a resentful affect. For Hesiod, this hatefulness
makes envy “wicked.” Consequently, Hesiod’s view is a deeply pessimistic one: first, we are
constituted in such a way that we lack agency, and second, certain affects (e.g., bad envy) are
wicked, resentful, and unhealthy.
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Unlike the Orphics, Hesiod understood that the Greeks’ Vernichtungslust could not be
ignored or extirpated. However, Hesiod failed as a cultural physician because he saw this instinct
as an incurable sickness. For Hesiod, certain facts of our existence entail a view of the world that
is pessimistic, and he lacked the ability to view these impulses in a non-pessimistic way. In
Hesiod’s mythology, humans are a degenerate form of earlier, better races. There were five ages
for Hesiod: the Golden Age, Silver Age, Bronze Age, Heroic Age, and Iron Age. In each
subsequent age, humans degenerate and become more miserable. By the Iron Age, the period
right after the Trojan War, Hesiod says, “For now is the race of iron; and they will never cease
from toil and misery by day or night, in constant distress, and the gods will give them harsh
troubles. Nevertheless, they shall have good mixed with ill. Yet Zeus will destroy this race of
men also” (Works and Days 172-5). So, according to Hesiod, earlier, better humans “lived
remote from ills, without harsh toil and the grievous sicknesses that are deadly to men” (Works
and Days 94-5), but humans now need to toil and work until Zeus decides to destroy them. For
Hesiod, humans are powerless compared to the gods. Human misery or joy is decided by the
gods, whether Zeus or Eris, and finally, the advice that Hesiod provides is that we should try to
give the gods “no cause for offense” (Works and Days 827).
In Hesiod’s eyes, the bad Eris is an evil affect that cannot be cured. His pessimistic
worldview poses the same challenge that Schopenhauer presents for Nietzsche. Brian Leiter
summarizes this challenge well:
Nietzsche’s concern is why we who confront seriously the terrible truths about the
human situation—even before the ones constituted by pain and suffering befall us—
should keep on living, when we know full well that life promises systematic suffering,
immorality, and illusion? Why not accept Schopenhauer’s apparent verdict, and give
up on life altogether? (Leiter, forthcoming)
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Hesiod, like Schopenhauer, was committed to reporting about the world truthfully, but at the
expense of health—he saw humanity and himself as necessarily doomed to wicked impulses. But
he never justified why we should (or could) keep on living despite such pessimistic conclusions.
According to Nietzsche, Homer and Hesiod “depicted the same age” (D 189), an age of
bellum omnium contra omnes. Hesiod is honest about his description of the world—he saw a
world full of wicked impulses and created a mythology that explained this wickedness. However,
“Honesty,” Nietzsche argues, “would lead to nausea and suicide. But now our honesty has a
counterforce that helps us avoid such consequences: art, as the good will to appearance” (GS
107). The Greeks did not achieve their health through Hesiod. What was required for health—
and is required for the health of an individual or a culture—was a psychological shift in how one
could see the world. That is, a change in the affects and values one has about reality, even in its
most brutal and harshest forms.

2.4

Homer the Cultural Physician
Hesiod could not imagine a world that was worth living in and in which the impulses of

war and cruelty are necessary. Homer, on the other hand, accomplished the task of glorifying
even these war-like impulses. Homer’s mythology depicted the same events as Hesiod, but he
rendered them with a positive valence. In Greece after Homer, Nietzsche argues that “its colors
through an artistic deception, seem lighter, gentler and warmer, its people, in this warm, multicolored light, seem better and more likeable” (HC 175). Nietzsche often describes different
affective states as different ways in which the world is “colored.”11 The artist, including the poet,
influences the perspectives through which one experiences the world. There are a few ways to

11

See HH II: 148; HH II: 116; D 26, 255, 426, 561; GS 7, 139, 152, 301.
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interpret this claim about how our affective states “color” the world. On the one hand,
Maudemarie Clark argues that Nietzsche uses “color” as a “metaphor for value” (Clark 1998,
68).12 Paul Katsafanas, however, argues, “Nietzsche will speak of affects and drives as
‘coloring’, ‘gilding’, ‘lighting’, and ‘staining’ the world. These terms suggest that affects and
drives highlight or even alter aspects of an experience” (Katsafanas 2013a, 167). Although
Katsafanas’ suggestion that the poet actually “recolors” the world is strong, it is more accurate to
what Nietzsche argues. If the poet can cause a change in one’s psychology, then the poet also has
the power to change our experience, including experiential content, like color. In his discussion
of the dangers of Romanticism, Nietzsche describes one of the benefits of poetry as “spreading a
Homeric light and splendor over all things” (GS 370). Crucially, Nietzsche does not think that
the poet can do this through an act of deliberative willing. For Nietzsche, a person doesn’t
choose her values and affects. A poet like Homer sees the world in glorified way, and this kind
of psychology is common among artists.
What is unique about an artist, as opposed to any other person, is that the artist translates
their affective states into art. In an aphorism titled “Towards a psychology of the artist,”
Nietzsche argues, “One physiological precondition is indispensable for there to be art or any sort
of aesthetic action or vision: intoxication” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 8). For Nietzsche, intoxication is a
characteristically strong feeling. Nietzsche argues, “the essential thing about intoxication is the
feeling of fullness and increasing strength” (ibid.). Moreover, intoxication is an affect that is
strong enough to cause an action by overpowering competing psychological forces. We can use
“the most ancient and original form of intoxication”—sexual excitement—as an example. Sexual
excitement becomes intoxicating when the desire for sex becomes strong enough to overcome
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See also Clark and Dudrick 2007, 203.
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any other competing drives. An animal may be hungry, but sexual excitement can overcome
even this impulse. Furthermore, intoxication is not merely a supremely strong affect that causes
an action. “This feeling,” Nietzsche argues, “makes us release ourselves onto things, we force
them to accept us, we violate them,—this process is called idealizing” (ibid.). “Idealizing,” then,
happens across the animal kingdom. This action of forcing oneself onto an object is
characteristic of the artist—the artist creates art in her own image. She forces her medium to
become what she desires. We can imagine, for example, that the characters in Michelangelo’s
sculptures are not true to nature but are instead the idealized forms of his own imagination.
Nietzsche argues, “[The born painter] never works ‘from nature’—he leaves it to his instinct, his
camera obscura” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 7). So, intoxication is a strong affect that causes one to act
and idealize. For such an artist, “everything he sees, everything he wants, he sees swollen,
driven, robust, overloaded with strength” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 8). Although Homer and Hesiod
“depicted the same age” Homer depicted this age of human heroes and victory in which humans
overflow with strength and guile, according to his “camera obscura.” Hesiod, on other hand, has
“the opposite condition, a specific anti-artistry of the instinct,—a way of being that impoverishes
all things, dilutes them, makes them waste away” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 9).
Nietzsche argues, “The greatest fact in the cultivation of Greece remains that Homer
became pan-Hellenic so early. All the spiritual and human freedom the Greeks attained to goes
back to this fact” (HH II: 262). However, Homer did not intend to change Greek culture. He was
not a poetic political reformer—that would surely be an odd claim for Nietzsche to make.
Instead, Homer provoked this reaction among the Greeks because his skill surpassed anyone else
at that time; he became a figure of envy. Nietzsche argues, “The Greek is envious and does not
experience this characteristic as a blemish, but as the effect of a benevolent deity” (HC 177).
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Homer became a standard to compete against, he became revered, and the reverence for Homer
invoked envy in other Greeks. Nietzsche describes an “attack” on Homer by other poets, who
strove to do what Homer did but to do it better, i.e., to write poetry like Homer, but to write it
more beautifully. He argues, “We do not understand the strength of this attack on the national
hero of poetry unless we construe the root of the attack to be the immense desire to take the place
of the fallen poet and inherit his fame” (ibid.). The “tiger-like” Vernichtungslust of the Greeks
compelled them not only to emulate Homer, but to best him.13 “The Greek artists,” according to
Nietzsche, “poetized in order to conquer; their whole art cannot be thought of apart from contest”
(HH I: 170). Unlike Hesiod, Homer did not consider this impulse wicked, and unlike the
Orphics, Homer did not view the body as a “prison” for the soul. Instead, Homer provided the
Greeks with an inspiration to express their instincts externally. Homer rendered himself and his
heroes enviable. For the Greeks, when one experiences something great, he does not stand in
awe of it, but wants to gain power over it: “the greater and more eminent a Greek man is, the
brighter the flame of ambition to erupt from him” (HC 175).
Homer’s role as a poet is crucial to understanding why he had such an influence on the
ancient world: according to Nietzsche, in the ancient world poetry is an efficient means to gain
influence.
In those ancient times that called poetry into being, one really did aim at utility, and a
very great utility at that; back then, when one let rhythm penetrate speech—that
rhythmic force that reorganizes all the atoms of a sentence, bids one to select one’s
words and gives thoughts a new color and makes them darker, stranger, more distant: a
superstitious utility, of course! (GS 84)

13

The motivating force of envy that Homer invoked had an effect not only on the world of poetry but on the
craftsmen and institutions of Greece as well. The meaningful struggle to best one’s rival is commonly referred to as
agon. A discussion of the various ways agon affected the ancient Greek culture and its institutions is beyond the
scope of this paper. For a discussion on these topics, see Siemens 2002, Acampora 2013, and Higgins 2015.
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In ancient times, poetry provided an opportunity to impress upon others one’s own experience.
Nietzsche argues that, “By means of rhythm one thus tried to compel them and to exercise a
power over them: one cast poetry around them like a magical snare” (ibid.). The poet seeks to
make his idealization have meaning not just for himself but also for others. Homer presented the
world in a way that was desirable. To incite envy as Homern did, a poet must be good at
presenting the world in a desirable way, but to gain influence, he must have some idea of the
reality of the individuals (i.e., of their psychology and culture) whom she is trying to influence.
Analogously, for the physician to cure her patient, she must have a proper understanding of her
patient’s physiology.
Homer excelled in his capacity as cultural physician. He recognized the reality of
necessary impulses and created a desirable image of the world based on these impulses.
Nietzsche argues, “Three-quarters of Homer is convention [...] he wants to conquer immediately
[...] the first condition is that he shall also be understood immediately” (HH II: 122).14 To be
understood immediately, Homer rendered the world in such a way that the Greeks’
Vernichtungslust could not be ignored—he did not make the same mistake as the Orphics. And
not only did he refuse to deny these instincts, he made them characteristics of the most enviable
persons, namely Odysseus and Achilles. He immediately excited the Greeks because he knew
what would excite them. On the one hand, Odysseus used his cleverness and adaptability to best
his opponents: the Harpies, the Cyclops Polyphemus, and Circe. On the other, Achilles
dominated his opponents with an uncompromising rage. In depicting his heroes in these ways,
Homer established a system of values around which Greece in the tragic age flourished.

14

See also HH II: 221; D 544.
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Homer has a healthy psychology; his poetry is mere fantasy, but it is, as Nietzsche says,
art “in which the will to deception has good conscience on its side” (GM III: 25). In The Gay
Science, Nietzsche describes this kind of art:
Honesty would lead to nausea and suicide. But now there is a counterforce against our
honesty that helps us to avoid such consequences: art as the good will to appearance.
We do not always keep our eyes from rounding off something and, as it were, finishing
the poem; and then it is no longer eternal imperfection that we carry across the river of
becoming—then we have the sense of carrying a goddess, and feel proud and childlike
as we perform this service. As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for
us, and art furnishes us with eyes and hands and above all the good conscience to be
able to turn ourselves into such a phenomenon. (GS 107)
Homer’s glorified depiction of pre-Homeric Greece was necessary for the Greeks to escape the
nausea-inducing pessimism of other mythological accounts. Crucially, Homer’s poetry does not
alter the fact that the events of the Trojan were brutal and bloody. It is, however, an idealized
presentation of these events for the sake of overcoming unhealthy pessimism.
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche argues that suffering is a terrible truth about human
existence. On Nietzsche’s view, like Hesiod’s, we are bound to suffer: “[man] was for the most
part a diseased animal” (GM III: 28). However, Nietzsche continues, “the suffering itself was not
his problem, rather that the answer was missing to the scream of his question: ‘To what end
suffering?’” (ibid.) Hesiod’s failure as a physician was not that he noticed suffering, but that he
failed to realize that it is the meaninglessness of suffering that makes it terrible. Homer, on the
other hand, provided the Greeks with a meaning for their suffering. Instead of condemning the
war-like instincts of the Greeks, Homer created the type of gods who became witnesses to this
war and gave it a meaningful context. Nietzsche argues,
It is certain in any case that the Greeks still knew of no more pleasant offering with
which to garnish the happiness of their gods than the joys of cruelty. With what sort of
eyes do you think Homer had his gods look down on the fates of humans? What was
the ultimate meaning of the Trojan wars and similar tragic horrors? There can be no
doubt at all: they were meant as festival games for the gods. (GM II: 7)
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Homer provided a new way of viewing the Greeks’ bloody and brutal history. As a poet, he
glorified the exploits of Odysseus and Achilles for the sake of making them a spectacle. His
primary concern was not with “getting the facts right”—his primary concern was making a world
that was interesting for the gods, and as Nietzsche argues, these events were probably also
“festival games for the poets” (ibid.). Homer wanted to make the world a worthy spectacle for
himself—his drive to dissimulation was a reaction to preserve his own health. In this way,
“Homer is so much at home among the gods” (HH I:125).
As an artist, Homer left it “to his instincts, his camera obscura, to sift through and
express the ‘matter at hand’, ‘nature’, and object of ‘experience’…” (TI ‘Skirmishes’ 7) Homer’s
primary concern was not to depict the events exactly as they happened, but to depict his idealized
vision. Therefore, Nietzsche quotes Homer: “For as Homer says, ‘Bards tell many a lie’” (GS
84). However, as Nietzsche argues, “In the end, it comes down to the purpose the lie is supposed
to serve” (A 56). Homer lied to make the world a worthy spectacle:
The facility and frivolity of the Homeric fantasy was necessary for soothing the
immoderately passionate disposition and over-subtle intellect of the Greeks and
temporarily banishing them. When their intellect speaks, how cruel and bitter life
appears! They do not deceive themselves, but they deliberately and playfully embellish
life with lies. (HH I: 154)
However, on Nietzsche’s view, lying does not always serve such healthy ends. Nietzsche argues,
“Plato contra Homer: that is the complete, the genuine antagonism—there the ‘otherworldly one’
with the best of wills, the great slanderer of life; here its involuntary deifier” (GM III: 25). On
Nietzsche’s view, Plato’s world is saturated in moral lies. Homer’s lies, on the other hand, serve
only to empower his heroes—Achilles is neither morally good nor evil. He is, however, clever,
beautiful, and an exceptional liar.
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What prevents Homer from becoming an ‘otherworldy one’, like Plato, was that he was
not merely a poet; he was also an astute observer of human behavior and motivation. His poetry
is grounded in what Brian Leiter calls “Classical Realism.” As Leiter explains, “Realism in this
sense refers to a certain hard-headed, unromantic, uncompromising attitude, which manifests
itself in a brutal honesty and candor in the assessment of human motives and the portrayal of
human affairs” (Leiter 2015, 38). Importantly, Classical Realism is not grounded in the
unconditional will to truth. It is a desire for knowledge in the sense that knowledge can give us
“a feeling of power” (TI ‘Errors’ 5). Nietzsche describes the realism in Greece as, “that strong,
stern, hard matter-of-factness instinctive to older Hellenes” and “courage in the face of reality”
(TI ‘Ancients’ 2). The drive to truth manifested itself in Greek psychology as this Classical
Realism. Nietzsche admires the Classical Realism of the Greeks in the tragic age, and for
Nietzsche, Thucydides is a paragon example of Classical Realism. He argues,
What is it I love in Thucydides, why do I honor him more highly than Plato? He takes
the most comprehensive and impartial delight in all that is typical in men and events
and believes that to each type there pertains a quantum of good sense: this he seeks to
discover. […] Thus is him, the portrayer of man, that culture of the most impartial
knowledge of the world finds its last glorious flower: that culture which had in
Sophocles its poet, in Pericles its statesman, in Hippocrates its physician, in
Democritus its natural philosopher, which deserves to be baptized with the name of its
teachers, the Sophists. (D 168)
Nietzsche argues that Thucydides is part of “that culture of the most impartial knowledge of the
world.” This “impartial knowledge” is not “objectivity” in the sense that objectivity is
“disinterested contemplation” (GM III: 12), which Nietzsche criticizes. Thucydides’ impartial
knowledge cannot be disinterested contemplation because Nietzsche praises Thucydides, saying,
“there are fewer thinkers with so many ulterior motives” (TI ‘Ancients’ 2). Nietzsche highlights
some of these “ulterior motives”: Thucydides’ “unconditional will not to be fooled and to see
reason in reality,—not in ‘reason’, and even less in ‘morality’” (ibid.). This unconditional will
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not to be fooled is not an unconditional will to truth. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche argues that
the unconditional will to truth is not that “I do not want to let myself be deceived [Ich will mich
nicht täuschen lassen],” it is that “I will not deceive, not even myself [Ich will nicht täuschen,
auch mich selbst nicht]” (GS 344). We should not confuse these two. “Note,” Nietzsche warns
us, “that the reasons for the former lie in a completely different area from those for the latter”
(ibid.). For Nietzsche, the desire not to let oneself be deceived [Ich will mich nicht täuschen
lassen] does not necessarily presuppose that self-deception is in itself bad. A person may want
not to let themselves be deceived because knowledge is beneficial to them and not because
knowledge is unconditionally valuable. For example, the more a person knows about an
organism’s psychology and physiology, the more power she has over that organism. Therefore,
Nietzsche argues, “Thucydides has self-control, and consequently he has control over things as
well” (TI ‘Ancients’ 2).
The self-control comes from the fact that he could allow himself not to be deceived—this
ability is a testament to Thucydides’ strength in the face of reality, which is sometimes terrible.
As Nietzsche argues, “what divides natures like Thucydides from natures like Plato is courage in
the face of reality: Plato is a coward in the face of reality—consequently, he escapes into the
ideal” (ibid.). Thucydides’ courage, which is indicative of “natures like Thucydides” (i.e., the list
of Greek figures from D 168), keeps him impartial in the face of reality—Thucydides does not
need to create an ideal, like Plato. Thus, Thucydides has the courage to know about reality and
this desire for knowledge is motivated not by an unconditional will to truth. Thucydides
investigates impartially for the sake of not wanting to be fooled—to be fooled about reality
would mean to have less control over reality.
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Thucydides’ impartiality served as a means to become more powerful—to know more
about nature, and thus have more power over it—but Nietzsche argues that Thucydides is “the
great summation, the final manifestation of that strong, severe, harsh objectivity that lay in the
instincts of the more ancient Hellenes” (TI ‘Ancients’ 2, emphasis added). Homer’s poetry
embodies this Classical Realism—he never denies the Greeks’ Vernichtungslust, but he provides
a scheme of values such that the Greeks could flourish in light of their instincts and history.
Unlike the Orphics, who thought that the body was a prison for the soul, the heroes and gods of
the Homeric poems are not above or more than their instincts. And unlike Hesiod’s account of
psychology, Homer did not view human drives as wicked; Homer’s heroes embraced the
ineradicable impulses, like envy or wrath. In a section titled “The Greek Ideal,” Nietzsche
describes what the Greeks found valuable about Odysseus,
What did the Greeks admire about Odysseus? Above all, his capacity for lying, and for
cunning and terrible retribution; his being equal to contingencies; when need be,
appearing nobler than the noblest; the ability to be whatever he chose; heroic
perseverance; having all means at his command; possession of intellect […] all this is
the Greek ideal! (D 306)
The Greeks saw Odysseus as a hero because of capacities that he possessed, including an ability
to lie. This Greek ideal, which we find in the heroes of Homer’s myths, includes skillful lying, a
pursuit of knowledge, and employment of both for the sake of other drives, like “certain strong
and powerful drives like the enterprising spirit, daring, vengeance, cunning, rapacity and the
desire to dominate” (BGE 201). The drive to truth is employed by the Homeric drives, and has a
new meaning under them. Thus, both the logical and the Greek instinctual Vernichtungslust are
retained in Homer’s poems. What emerges out of the pessimistic pre-Homeric abyss is a healthy
Greek ideal that venerates humans and glorifies them for the kinds of creatures they are.
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3

TRUTH AND DISSIMULATION IN NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHICAL
PSYCHOLOGY

At this point, it is important now to explain how Nietzsche thinks this kind of Homeric
self-deception works. It cannot be the case that Nietzsche thinks Homer (or anybody) could lie
about the world and believe those lies to be true. David Hume describes the absurdity of this idea
well in his explanation of the difference between a fiction and a belief. He argues,
We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse but it is not in
our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed. It follows, therefore,
that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which
is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can
be commanded at pleasure. (EHU 5.2)
Hume’s point is straightforward: There is a gap between fiction and belief. When we consciously
tell a lie, we cannot believe that lie to be true. For example, we can forget that it was a lie.
Imagine the odd sensation one has when he forgets whether a memory was a dream or something
that really happened to him. In any case, for Nietzsche’s psychology of the artist to make sense,
which is necessary for understanding how Homer is a cultural physician, he must be able to
account for how a person can move from a fictional idea to the belief that this idea is nonfictional. In this section, I argue that Nietzsche can account for this by a concept that I call
Nietzschean dissimulation.
As a psychologist, Nietzsche is interested in explaining our values, affects, and morals.
His method is to discover their causes, rejecting that humans have any exceptional status within
nature’s causal order. He aims to “translate humanity back into nature” (BGE 230). This method
is in opposition to the “old-style psychology, the psychology of the will” (TI ‘Errors’ 7), which is
not sufficient for explaining what, on Nietzsche’s view, we now understand about humans and
nature, namely that all of nature, including humans, operates under the same kind of causal
necessity. In the preface to The Gay Science, Nietzsche argues, “philosophy has been no more
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than an interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of the body” (GS P 2)—the
psychology of the will is an example of such a misunderstanding (e.g., that we are somehow
above or are more than our bodies). Nietzsche’s “new psychology” focuses on the fact that “one
is necessary, one is a piece of fate” (TI ‘Errors’ 8).15 And, “with intrepid Oedipus eyes and
sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of old metaphysical bird catchers who have been
piping at him all too long, ‘you are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin!’” (BGE
230),16 Nietzsche locates our mental life in drives and wills that operate like desires, instincts, or
powerful motivational impulses.Section heading

3.1

The Will to Truth
Nietzsche argues that we experience our affects and values only as the effects of our

drives;17 the antecedent causes remain unknown (TI ‘Errors’ 5). That is, the way the drives
affect our experience (e.g., what we value) indicates little—or possibly nothing at all—about
their origins. So, when we reflect on where our affects and values come from, we are seeking

See also HH I: 18, 39; GS 109, 115; BGE 18, 19, 21; TI ‘Errors’ 7.
In other places, Nietzsche calls this “siren song of old metaphysical bird catchers” the “metaphysical need.” See
HH I: 26; GS 151, 347.
17
Some have argued that “Nietzsche ultimately treats drives not as attributes of agents (like desires) but as agents
themselves” (Poellner 2005, 174). This view is the “Homunculi View.” One merit of this view is that it gives a clear
explanation of Nietzsche’s frequent characterization of drives as having agent-like characteristics. For example,
“suppose a drive finds itself at the point at which it desires gratification—or exercise of its strength, or discharge of
its strength, or the saturation of an emptiness” (D 119). However, this view “would be rather incongruous for
Nietzsche,” as Paul Katsafanas argues, “who so vociferously argues against the superfluous positing of subjects”
(Katsafanas 2013b, 728). In addition, Nietzsche states that these agent-like descriptions “are all metaphors” (D 119).
Others, like Katsafanas and Christopher Janaway, have argued that drives “are glossed as inclinations and aversions
or fors and againsts” (Janaway 2007, 214). Katsafanas adds to this account, “A drive [for Nietzsche] is a disposition
that induces an evaluative orientation. Drives manifest themselves by structuring the agent’s perceptions, affects,
and reflective thought” (Katsafanas 2013b, 752). This second view is the “Dispositional View.” On the
Dispositional View, drives are the affective and evaluative dispositions of individuals. The basic observation here is
that our drives are the psychological dispositions we have for (or against) certain affects and values. It would be
strange, as the proponents of the Dispositional View argue, to imagine that Nietzsche thinks drives just are
homunculi. In this paper, I do not give an account of what drives are on Nietzsche’s view. Instead, I assume the
Dispositional View is true. However, I discuss drives as having “agent-like properties” in the same sense that
Nietzsche does in Daybreak 119, which I take to be useful but metaphorical.
15
16
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some truth about their antecedent causes. This task is destined to be largely unsuccessful,
however, because our experience is wholly a collection of effects. Still, we desire to know where
our affects and values come from. For example, if one feels pain, he desires to locate the source
of this pain, even if locating this source is merely an immediate and instinctual attempt to escape
it. Nietzsche does not begrudge our attempts to discover what the sources of our experience are.
As he argues, “To trace something back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying
and gives moreover a feeling of power” (TI ‘Errors’ 5). We desire knowledge because it is
comforting and even empowering, and on Nietzsche’s account, this desire is the origin of the
drive to truth. As Nietzsche argues, “Danger, disquiet, anxiety attend the unknown—the first
instinct18 is to eliminate these distressing states” (ibid.). Consciously, a person may feel
compelled to discover the truth, but he has this conscious desire because he is unconsciously
driven away from distressing states. So, the drive to truth is a drive to eliminate distress, but this
drive does not necessarily appear in experience as a drive to eliminate distress. To us, truth
appears important.
On Nietzsche’s view, even though the drive to truth is an important facet of human
psychology, there is a difference between “the question whether truth is necessary” and the
conviction that “nothing is more necessary than truth; and in relation to it, everything has only
secondary value” (GS 344). Like all drives, if it could, the drive to truth would dominate the
others. If the drive to truth successfully dominates, it becomes “the unconditional will to truth”
(ibid.). This unconditional will to truth still has it origin in eliminating fear of the unknown and
understanding one’s experience for the sake of an organism’s health, but Nietzsche asks,

According to Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche seems to regard Intinkt [instinct] and Trieb [drive] as terminological
variants; he will sometimes alternate between the two in the same sentence (see, for example, GS 1)” (Katsafanas
2013b, 727n). Throughout this paper I also regard these terms as interchangeable.
18
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Is it really less harmful, dangerous, disastrous not to want to let oneself be deceived?
What do you know in advance about the character of existence to be able to decide
whether the greater advantage is on the side of the unconditionally distrustful or of the
unconditionally trusting? But should both be necessary—a lot of trust as well as a lot
of mistrust—then where might science get the unconditional belief or conviction on
which it rests, that truth is more important than anything else, than every other
conviction? Precisely this conviction could never have originated if truth and untruth
had constantly made it clear they were both useful, as they are. (GS 344)
The unconditional will to truth, which is motivated by fear of the unknown, is likely to cause us
harm because truth has a limited utility—truth can be useful or harmful depending on
circumstances.
Truths can be harmful, on Nietzsche’s view, when “the truth is terrible” (EH IV:1). Brian
Leiter explains what this means. Leiter argues, for example, that for Nietzsche “there are terrible
existential truths about the human situation” (Leiter, forthcoming). These truths are
Schopenhauerian; they are generally pessimistic truths about the insignificance of existence and
the persistent insatiability of the will.19 Crucially, the terribleness of a truth depends on the
affective response that one has to it. That is, the magnitude of the terribleness of a truth depends
more on who knows it than what it is. As Leiter argues, “All the terrible truths are terrible if
contemplated, if internalized, and taken seriously” (ibid.). Furthermore, he argues,
what is really at stake for Nietzsche is that life should be experienced as worth living,
not that a rational or cognitive warrant exists for continuing to live. The issue is our
affective or emotional attachment to life, which the ‘terrible truths’, at least when taken
seriously, threaten to undermine; the issue is not whether there are good reasons for
continued life. (ibid.)
On Nietzsche’s view, good reasons (i.e., justifications with cognitive content) do not motivate us
to keep living in light of terrible truths.

In the first section of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer argues, “Only deeper investigation,
more difficult abstraction, the separation of what is different, and the combination of what is identical can lead us to
this truth. This truth, which must be very serious and grave is not terrible to everyone, is that a man also can say and
must say: ‘The world is my will’” (WWR I.1).
19
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One type of person whom these terrible truths would affect in an unhealthy way is the
person with an unconditional will to truth. This type of person thinks that every truth is worth
contemplating; they take them seriously because they believe that nothing is more necessary—
and more important—than truth. On Nietzsche’s view, Schopenhauer himself was an example of
this kind of individual. The unconditional drive to truth is ultimately why Schopenhauer could
not satisfyingly address “the problem of the value of existence,” which is: “Does existence have
any meaning at all?” (GS 357) Nietzsche argues,
The ungodliness of existence counted for [Schopenhauer] as something given,
palpable, indisputable: he always lost his philosopher’s composure and became
indignant when he saw anyone hesitate or beat around the bush on this point. This is
the locus of his whole integrity; unconditional and honest atheism is simply the
presupposition of his way of putting the problem [of the value of existence]. (GS 357)
Schopenhauer’s integrity is located in his intolerance for even the most attractive lies, and he
became angry when others’ actions and words reflected a less uncompromising honesty.
However, the way that Schopenhauer poses the problem of the value of existence demands some
reason (i.e., a justification with cognitive content) for existence other than the false reasons
offered by his contemporaries. That is, an affirmative answer to the question, “Does existence
have any meaning at all?” must be justified. However, as Nietzsche argues, “One can see what it
was that actually triumphed over the Christian god: Christian morality itself, the concept of
truthfulness that was taken ever more rigorously […] Looking at nature as if it were proof of the
goodness and care of a god; interpreting history in honour of some divine reason” (ibid.,
emphasis added). Even though Schopenhauer denied the idea of a Christian god, he still
maintained a commitment to the unconditional value of truth. Therefore, Nietzsche argues that
Schopenhauer’s pessimism is “his horrified look into a de-deified world that had become stupid,
blind, crazed, and questionable, his honest horror…” (ibid.). Schopenhauer’s pessimism is rooted
in the way he poses the problem of existence because this problem itself presupposes the
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unconditional value of truth. So, for Schopenhauer, the drive to truth “represents just itself as the
ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate master of all the other drives” (BGE 6), and “in
relation to [truth], everything has only secondary value” (GS 344), even a person’s health.

3.2

Dissimulation
The alternative to the unconditional will to truth is the conditioned will to truth. The will

to truth may be conditioned by self-deception, which plays a fundamental role in our
psychology—so, we have something of an instinct to be deceived. Nietzsche argues that life is
“aimed at semblance, i.e., error, deception, simulation, blinding, self-binding, and [that] life on
the largest scale has actually always shown itself to be on the side of the most unscrupulous
polytropoi” (GS 344).20 He also tells us:
Man [...] has an invincible tendency to let himself be deceived and is enchanted with
happiness when the rhapsode tells him epic tales as if they were true, or when the actor
in a play plays the king even more regally than he is in reality. The intellect, that
master of dissimulation, is free and discharged from other slavish duties, so long as it
can deceive without harming, and then it celebrates its Saturnalia. (TL 2)
I call this tendency to deceive dissimulation. 21 This is the tendency we have to deceive
ourselves, where such deceptions have a functional value for us. We do not necessarily value

This is the word Homer uses to describes Odysseus in the first line of The Odyssey. The prefix ‘poly-’ means
‘many’, while the noun ‘tropos’ has several meanings. It can mean ‘custom’, ‘guise’, or ‘style’. Nietzsche’s
interpretation of Homer’s use of the word comes from the many false personalities Odysseus dons in The Odyssey.
21
In this paper, I use the word ‘dissimulation’ as a technical term as opposed to ‘lie’ because a person may or may
not be aware of their dissimulations. Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between a “liar” and a “bullshitter” is useful here.
Frankfurt argues, “But the fact about himself that the liar hides is that he is attempting to lead us away from a correct
apprehension of reality; we are not to know that he wants us to believe something he supposes to be false. The fact
about himself that the bullshitter hides, on the other hand, is that the truth-values of his statements are of no central
interest to him; what we are not to understand is that his intention is neither to report the truth nor conceal it”
(Frankfurt 1986, 13–14). Lying is an intentional rejection of truth; therefore, lying presupposes that one knows the
truth. The bullshitter may not know the truth because he doesn’t care about it, presumably because he has some
other end to achieve. Similarly, a person can dissimulate without knowing that they are doing so. The crucial
difference between Frankfurt’s “bullshitting” and my account of Nietzschean dissimulation is that bullshitting is a
moral concept for Frankfurt, while dissimulation is the activity of a drive and necessary for experience at all.
Dissimulation is not a moral issue for Nietzsche; it is a psychological mechanism necessary for an organism’s
health. Moreover, the word ‘dissimulation’ is the appropriate technical term for etymological reasons. In Latin, the
verb ‘simulare’ means ‘to look like’, ‘to pretend’, or to ‘imitate’, and the prefix ‘dis-’ means ‘completely’. The verb
20
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deceptions in themselves; rather, we value deceptions for the sake of some other end (e.g.,
aesthetic pleasure). For example, when painting a portrait, an artist can deviate from the way her
subject appears, manipulating details to make the painting more beautiful. For this artist,
aesthetic pleasure is more important than a true representation—she prefers representing the
world differently than it is because it feels pleasing to do so. But dissimulation is not restricted to
self-reflective choices, like those of the artist in my example. It plays a more general role in
Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology—experience itself presupposes dissimulation. In a section
titled, “Life not an argument,” Nietzsche describes this kind of dissimulation,
We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are able to live—by positing
bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without
these articles of faith [Glaubenartikel] no one could endure living! But that does not
prove them. Life is not an argument; the conditions of life might include error [unter
den Bedingungen des Lebens könnte der Irrthum sein]! (GS 121)22
Crucially, Nietzsche argues that “the conditions of life might include error.” We must believe in
these “articles of faith” (i.e., dissimulations) in order to perform basic physiological activities.
Consider, for example, how Nietzsche describes our experience of “cause” and “effect”: “Cause
and effect: there is probably never such a duality; in truth a continuum faces us, from which we
isolate a few pieces, just as we always perceive a movement only as isolated points, i.e., do not
really see, but infer” (GS 112, emphasis added). Nietzsche makes two important remarks about
causation. First, we never see causation; we merely infer that one event follows another. This
observation is similar to David Hume’s view of causation. Hume argues,
upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all of nature, any one instance of
connection, which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate.
One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem
conjoined, but never connected. (EHU 7.2.1)
‘dissimulare’ sometimes has a similar meaning to ‘simulare’, as in ‘to feign that a thing is not that which it is’, ‘to
disguise’, or ‘to hide’. But its second meaning is ‘to leave unnoticed’ or ‘to neglect’. So, the deception in
‘dissimulare’ is a self-deception—it is hiding something from oneself without the knowledge of doing so.
22
See also BGE 1, 4, 230; GS 354; GM III: 12, 24.
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Hume concludes that our concepts “cause” and “effect” do not correspond with any real entities.
We infer that certain effects follow from certain causes as a matter of conditioning—“[one] now
feels these events to be connected in his imagination” (EHU 7.2). Similarly, Nietzsche argues,
“we reason, ‘this and that must precede for that to follow’—but we haven’t thereby understood
anything” (GS 112). For both Hume and Nietzsche, “cause” and “effect” are concepts that are
fundamental to the way we experience the world, but they do not correspond with any real
entities. For Hume, the process of connecting two events happens in the “imagination.” For
Nietzsche, it occurs in the unconscious process of dissimulation.
The second point Nietzsche makes about causation is that we form the concepts “cause”
and “effect” by isolating a few pieces of our experience, while ignoring the whole “continuum”
of experience. That is, when designating one event as a “cause” and another as an “effect,” we
are isolating these events from an entire continuum of sense data. If I see my friend push a cup
off the edge of a table, for example, my judgment that “his hand caused the cup to fall”
simplifies a much more complex set of natural phenomena (e.g., other activity happening in my
field of vision). The cause (his hand moving) and the effect (the cup falling) are both events that
my mind isolates in an otherwise continuous stream of sense data. When we infer some effect
from a cause, Nietzsche argues, “There is an infinite number of processes that elude us in this
second of suddenness” (ibid.). To make sense of the “suddenness” of the “continuum” of
experience, only so much of it may enter our consciousness. This unconscious process includes
selecting and emphasizing the experiences that enter consciousness. Nietzsche describes this
unconscious selective process as active forgetting. He describes active forgetting in the following
way,
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Forgetfulness is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial believe; rather, it is an active
and in the strictest sense positive faculty of suppression, and is responsible for the fact
that whatever we experience, learn, or take into ourselves enters just as little into our
consciousness during the condition of digestion […] as does the entire thousand-fold
process through which the nourishing of our body, so-called ‘incorporation’, runs its
course. (GM II: 1)
For Nietzsche, what enters consciousness is the result of a “subterranean” world of “noise and
struggle” (ibid.). It is only through selective forgetting that we can form concepts like “cause”
and “effect.” Otherwise, Nietzsche argues, “An intellect that saw cause and effect as a
continuum, not, as we do, as arbitrary division and dismemberment—that saw the stream of the
event—would reject the concept of cause and effect and deny all determinedness” (GS 112). But
insofar as forgetting is an active force that prevents much of the “continuum” of experience from
entering consciousness, what does make it to the level of consciousness is a dissimulated version
of this continuum. So, concepts like “cause” and “effect” are crucial for experience, but they are
merely the distorted results of an unconscious active forgetfulness. And Nietzsche lists other
concepts that come from this same process. He argues, “We are operating with things that do not
exist—with lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces” (ibid.). We have the
concept, for example, of an absolutely straight line, even though such a line might not exist in
reality (or at least we have never experienced it). Peter Unger makes a similar distinction when
he talks about “absolute” terms. He argues,
The terms of knowledge, along with many other troublesome terms, belong to a class
of terms that is quite pervasive in our language. I call these absolute terms. The term
‘flat’, in its central, literal meaning is an absolute term. […] To say something is flat is
no different from saying it is absolutely, or perfectly flat. (Unger 1971, 94)
Unger is skeptical about whether we ever accurately apply certain absolute terms like ‘flat’. He
argues, “in the case of some of these [absolute] terms, fairly reasonable suppositions about the
world make it somewhat doubtful that the terms properly apply” (Unger 1971, 101). And insofar
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as ‘flat’ is an absolute term, we might be skeptical that it applies to any physical objects. When
we look at a flat surface, even under close inspection, “the surface is not one such that it is
logically impossible that there be a flatter one” (Unger 1971, 102). Therefore, such absolute
terms are helpful to the way we talk about the world, but they are inaccurate descriptions. When
Nietzsche argues, for example, that “lines” do not exist, we can take him to be saying that
absolute lines do not exist. Absolute terms are distortive and inaccurate, and to talk about reality
in absolute terms is a form of dissimulation. These dissimulations are, however, fundamental to
our experience. It would be impossible, and undesirable, to live in a world without concepts like
cause and effect. So, even our most basic experiences presuppose dissimulation.
Naturally, not all dissimulations contribute to an organism’s health. Nietzsche argues that
a dissimulation can be healthy “so long as it can deceive without harming” (TL 2), but it can also
be unhealthy. Take, for example, the concept of free will. Nietzsche argues that free will is “the
shadiest trick theologians have up their sleeves for making humanity 'responsible' in their sense
of the term, which is to say dependent on them” (TI ‘Errors’ 7). So, the belief in free will
involves dissimulation, just as in the case of cause and effect. “The notion of will was essentially
designed with punishment in mind, which is to say the desire to assign guilt” (ibid.). The error of
free will has its origin in the desire to punish and make others responsible and guilty for their
actions, and this error harms because it is an illusion that priestly types use to make humanity
“dependent on them” (ibid). Unlike concepts such as “cause” and “effect,” the concept of “free
will” is not fundamental to any healthy experience—its possible that we would be better off
without it.
Importantly, dissimulations oppose the drive to truth. When we dissimulate, we don’t
look into whether our dissimulations correspond with reality. To return to our earlier example,

36

we experience the world as a series of causes and effects, even though “cause” and “effect” do
not correspond with any real entities. However, the drive to truth causes us to want to know the
truth behind dissimulations (TI ‘Errors’ 5). But if the drive to truth becomes too strong, if it
succeeds in “represent[ing] just itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate
master of all the other drives” (BGE 6), we begin to mistrust all of our dissimulations. So, on the
one hand, dissimulation conditions the drive to truth; it is healthy to believe certain
dissimulations, like “the healthy concepts of cause and effect” (A 49). These concepts are the
target of the priestly type, who invents guilt and punishment “to destroy people’s sense of
causation: they are assassination attempts on the concepts of cause and effect!” (ibid.) On the
other hand, too many dissimulations or the wrong kind of dissimulations are for Nietzsche
antithetical to health. For example, guilt and free will are dissimulations meant to harm.
If we now return to Homer, we can see how Nietzsche accounts for the fact that Homer
can see reality through his “camera obscura” without consciously deciding to do so. If a poet
sees the world with a positive valence, as Homer does, then he can’t evaluate the world in any
other way. On Nietzsche’s view, Homer rendered the world as a beautiful and worthy spectacle
because that is the way he saw it. Moreover, insofar as artistic creation may be an unconscious
activity of selecting and emphasizing, the healthy artist, like Homer, does not necessarily know
for what reason she creates art. Instead, this artwork is the fortuitous byproduct of an organism
that is healthy, as Nietzsche says, “at bottom” (EH ‘Wise’ 2).
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4

CONCLUSION

For Nietzsche, one’s philosophy is preconditioned by how healthy or sick one already is:
“In some,” he argues, “it is their weaknesses that philosophize; in others, their riches and
strengths” (GS P 2). So, at the physiological level—“at bottom” (EH ‘Wise’ 2)—and before one
engages in philosophy, one needs to be healthy. For the possibility of healthy philosophy, a
culture needs “a philosophical physician in the exceptional sense of the term—someone who has
set himself the task of pursuing the problem of the total health of a people, time, race or of
humanity” (GS P 2). The health of the Greeks is traceable back to Homer, who is the cause of
“all the spiritual and human freedom the Greeks” (HH I: 262), and who pulled Greece out of the
“pre-Homeric abyss” (HC 179). But this cause was not mysterious. Homer had a profound
impact on the way the Greeks saw the world, according to Nietzsche. And the way we see the
world is due to the how we are constituted psychologically and physiologically. Healthy
individuals, like the Greeks of the tragic age, do not regard envy as justified because they have,
through reflective reasoning, discovered some argument in its favor. How we determine our
affects and values is not through discovering some truth about them; this determination is merely
the effect of the creatures we are. “While 'we' believe we are complaining about the vehemence
of a drive,” Nietzsche argues, “at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about another” (D
109).
The Greeks were healthy because they did not seek a justification for their instincts. It
takes a culture like the Greeks “to stop bravely at the surface, the fold, the skin; to worship
appearance, to believe in shapes, tones, words—in the whole Olympus of appearance!” (GS P 4)
On Nietzsche’s view, the “Greek genius” is not only a recognition that certain affects are
necessary, but it is a recognition that we are our drives and nothing else. The appearances we
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have are the deepest part about us, and thus, “Those Greeks were superficial—out of profundity!”
(GS P 4)
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